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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED G. JENSEN and
MIRIAM D. JENSEN,

Plaintiffs and Appellants

VS.
RAY L. NIELSEN and
MABEL W. NIELSEN,

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

Case

No.
12160

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by buyers to recover funds paid
on a real estate installment contract under the theory
of unjust enrichment.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court and a judgment
of no cause of action was entered against the plaintiffs.
A motion for a new trial was denied and this appeal
was taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment of
the District Court, or a remand for supplemental findings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants brought an action in February,
1965, in the District Court for Garfield Oounty, seeking restitution based on Respondents alleged unjust
enrichment.
The Respondents sold to the Appellants for $35,000.00 on installment contract their family unit motel
property located in Panguitch, Utah, known as Nelson's Motor Court. The contract was signed July 1,
1958. The Appellants paid $10,150.00 down, and took
possession. The required $200.00 monthly payments
were to be applied against accrued interest and the
balance on the principal. The Contract did not provide
for reduction of interest on advance payment (P.101),
the Sellers being older folks and desiring to use the
monthly payments for living expenses in their retirement years. The Buyers made payments (sometimes
delinquent) on the contract until December 1, 1961,
but they failed to pay the property taxes or assessments as they became due.
-1-

The Appellants stayed in possession of the property for a period of six months after default in the
payments, when the Respondents, under the provisions
of the contract (July, 1962), rescinded the same and
removed the contract documents from escrow.

i

The Appellants then vacated the premises and
the Respondents did not hear from them again until
two and one-half years later ( 1965) when they
brought suit against Sellers for $15,071.00. Respondents filed an Answer and the various proceedings
began.
Numer.ous attorneys represented the Respondents for various periods of time with changes of counsel coming about primarily because of Respondents age
and inability to understand legal proceedings. There
was an interlocutory appeal, which was dismissed by
this Court. The case was ultimately tried and Judgment was entered by the District Court, holding that
there was no unjust enrichment and this appeal was
taken.
Appellants seek to recover a return of their payments and cost of alleged improvements less the reasonable rental which Appellants testified is $200.00
per month.
It will be noted that Appellants were in possession for 48 months, but made only 34 monthly payments.

The sales contract contains the following provision:
"This contract shall be in default on the
part of the Buyers if they fail to make payments within 5 days after the dates herein
specified, or upon failure to do or perform
any other covenant and agreement herein
-2-
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contained. In the event of such default, the
sellers can demand possession of said property and re-enter said premises and remove
the purchasers and all other persons therefrom, and any payments made by the buyers up to the time of such breach shall be
retained by the sellers as compensation
for the use and occupation by the buyers of
the said premises."
The gravamen of Appellants case is that if the
Respondents (sellers) are permitted to retain the
money paid on the contract, the Respondents will be
unjustly enriched.
The Respondent, Mrs. Nielsen, testified that before the Contract was solemnized, Buyers asked Sellers concerning the income from this Motel in the previous five years. She testified that the Motel yielded
the following gross amounts: 1953 -$4,721.75; 1954
- $6, 727.00; 1955 - $4,509,00; 1956 - $6,327.50;
and in 1957 - $8,909.50.
The testimony of Buyer, Mr. Jensen, was that
during their four-year occupancy the motel yielded the
first year $9,000.00; second year $8,000.00; third year
$7,000.00 and the fourth and last year, until he quit
operating, it yielded $6,500.00. It appears, therefore,
that Buyer received income during his four years occupancy a total of $30,500.00. There is no evidence in
the record to indicate what the net income would be
many year.
The Motor Court was a family business (p. 220).
It did not have television, a swimming pool or air conditioning. Prior to the sale, the Sellers operated it
themselves, did their own labor and made their living
by renting motel units for family occupancy. During
-3-

the time the Buyers were in possession, they did the
same, until Mr. Jensen left to work away from Panguitch and left his wife to operate the Motel.
During the Buyers' occupancy of the Motel, Mr.
Jensen testified that some funds were expended by
him for improvments of the property. This proof was
disputed by the Sellers and the Court by its memorandum decision was unable to determine whether or not
these expenditures would be deemed improvements or maintenance. After objection to proposed
findings the court in its findings held improvement of
$2,977.00.
The motel consisted of 12 units, each separate
from the other. Each is essentially intended for housekeeping purposes. Its attraction to the traveling public
would, therefore, be somewhat limited. It was not
adorned as some glittering motels are, and was essentially the type of place you would expect to find a husband and wife operating.
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THERE WAS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
On the $35,000.00 motel contract for sale, the
Buyers (Appellants) paid $10,150.00 down, and
$200.00 monthly payments (until they became in default) of $6,800.00. Appellants also paid out certain
sums that they called improvements, which Respondents called maintenance. The only item determined as
an improvemet was for outside wall siding, $2,977.20.
Respondents note that it was not deemed an improvement in the Court's Memorandum Decision or in the
proposed Findings, but only after objections to Findings were filed.

Buyer, Fred Jensen, on direct examination, testified that $200.00 per month would be reasonable as
rental for the use of the premises. Buyers had used
the premises for four years or 48 months, which at
$200 per month, totals $9,600.00. This amount subtracted from the $16,950.00 (total cash paid), and
improvements of $2,977.00, totals $19,927.00, leaves
a balance of $10,327.00. Buyer testified that he had
been engaged in selling real estate and had sold properties in Panguitch immediately prior to his terminating this contract ( p. 93). He testified that he tried to
sell the motel, but the best offer was $30,000.00, received in November or December, of 1961, the approximate time the Buyers defaulted and refused to
further perform the contract or make any further payments. He testified that he did not think that was
enough money for the property, but he was never able
to get any higher offers, even though he had it listed
for $35,000.00. Mrs. Nielsen testified (p. 199) that in
her opinion the value of the Motel when it was taken
back on July 1, 1962 was $20,000. Applying this
$5,000.00 depreciation of the property or loss of bargain, it reduces the $10,327.00 to $5,327.00.
The Appellant, Fred G. Jensen, (p. 95) testified
that $2,500.00 was paid by the Respondents as a real
estate commission to the brother of the Appellant,
which amount should likewise be deducted, leaving a
balance of $2,827.00. The Buyer and Sellers stated
that there were also back unpaid taxes of $437.00 and
unpaid Street Assessments of $817.00 when the property was taken back by the Sellers (p. 120-121). These
sums the Buyers were obligated to pay under the contract. The Respondents, upon their retaking possession, were required to pay these amounts. After deducting same from the $2,827.00, it leaves a balance
of $1,573.00. Appellants testimony also was that they
-5--

had not made any replacements as to beds or rugs for
at least two years prior to the default. The Respondent,
Mrs. Nielsen, testified it was necessary for Sellers after
retaking possession to buy twelve mattresses for an
estimated cost of $1,200.00. When we apply this figure
and the other miscellaneous items in the record against
the $1,573.00, it leaves a nominal figure for Appellants
to get back under the case theory in Perkins vs. Spencer.
The evidence was also to the effect that in 1957,
the year prior to the Buyers going into possession, the
motel with twelve units grossed approximately
$8, 70000. The Buyer testified on rebuttal that it was
his recollection that in the year 1958 he grossed
$9,000.00; the year 1959, $8,000.00; the year 1960,
$7,000.00; the year 1961, $6,500.00, which indicates
that while he had possession he was gradually losing
business.
The Respondent Seller, Mrs. Nielsen, testified
that when they went back into possession, for the year
1963, they grossed $6,989.50; 1964, $6,208.00; 1965,
$6,135.00. These grosses are based on. the same motel
rates she had during the year 1957 before selling the
motel to the Appellants. It is her testimony that the
lower business was primarily caused by the Buyers'
failure to maintain the motel as a going business or to
properly operate it. It was recognized by the testimony
of both parties that there were many different factors
that could affect the business grosses, including other
motels in the area. In any event, the testimony was that
the business changed between the time that the Sellers delivered possession to the Buyers in 1958 and when
they took it back in 1962, and the effect of Appellants'
operation is that there was a loss of over $2,000.00 per
year, through 1965, in comparative grosses (p. 195).
--6-

The Buyers contended that they should be entitled to consideration for the alleged improvements
made, and then relied primarily on a composition stucco
siding that they put on the premises. When the Respondents delivered the premises to the Appellants in
1958, the Buyers acknowledged the property was in
good condition and repair. The Buyers also testified
that nine months later he put on the compositfon brick
sidewall for looks. Respondent Mrs. Nielsen testified
the composition wall was not an improvement to the
motel, and had the adverse effect of drawing heat out
of the units. The nails also damaged the plaster on the
inside walls.
It is alsn interesting to note that the Appellants'
brother-in-law, Buzz Jensen, (p. 182), received the
real estate commission from Sellers when he brought
Buyers and Sellers together on this transaction, also
turned out to be the salesman to Appellants of the compositi-on siding that went on the walls. Whether or not
this siding was an improvement was questioned, and
there was testimony to the effect that it was not an
improvement, but a detriment.

The other items that the Appellants rely on as
improvements are inconsequential and appear to be
only items of maintenance, and not worthy of consideration in this brief.
It is fundamental that a person going into equity
should do equity, and should come into court with clean
hands. As the court pointed out during the trial, an
action for unjust enrichment is not made for the purpose of rewarding a Buyer who (in his opinion) has
made a bad bargain, and then refuses to go forward
with the transaction. The Buyers (Appellants) took in
over $30,000.00 over a four year possession period
-7-

(p. 200). The Court held this also was a factor that
shouldn't be overlooked. The court in essence stated
that to return to Buyers the forfeited sums under these
circumstances would not be fair.

Our Supreme Court in the case of Perkins vs.
Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 p2 446 (a landlord tenant
situation) set forth the doctrine of unjust enrichment,
and indicated factors to be considered.

i

1. Loss of an advantageous bargain.

erty.

2. Ai:y damage to or depreciation of the prop-

3. Any decline in value due to change in market '
value of the property not allowed for in items numbers
1 and 2, and
4. For the fair rental value of the property during the period of occupancy.
The total of such sums are to be deducted from
the total amount paid in, plus any improvements for
which it would be fair to allow recovery. Under the
Perkins vs. Spencer case there is no aniount that should
be returned to Appellants.
The Respondents primarily rely in their defense
on our Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson vs. Swan,
2 Utah 2d 59, 278 Pac. 2d 294.
"Parties to contract to purchase real
estate have right to contract that in event
of default, all payments which have been
made will be forfeited as liquidated damages, and such right should not be lightly
interfered with, and it is 'Only when forfeiture would be so grossly excessive as to
be entirely disproportionate to any possible
loss that might have been contemplated, so
that to enforce it would shock conscience,
-8-
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that court of equity will refuse to enforce
provision."
When a trial judge has made such a determination, our Supreme Court will regard it as prima facie
correct and will not disturb it unless it is plainly erroneous. Burton vs. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institute,
122 Utah, 360 249 P.2d 514.
In Carlson vs. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272 332 P.2d
989, the Court stated that where one side or the other
is to be penalized by enforcement of the contract so
unconscionable that no fair-minded person would view
the ensuing result with a profound sense of injustice
that equity will deny the use of its jurisdiction in enforcement of all such unconscionability. It is not the
function of the Court to renegotiate the contract of
the parties.
In our case it was the acts of the Appellants that
brought about the contract termination. Buyers decided they didn't like the bargain they had made and
wanted to get out of it, so they failed to give the motel
proper care and maintenance, and finally, for all practical effects, abandoned it. The Buyer, Mr. Jensen,
had obtained employment elsewhere and was not residing on the property. He did, however, have his wife
and children there when the agreement was terminated. They lived in the home, without adequate furniture,
even using the outdoor picnic table for their indoor
use (p. 103, 119). Is it any wonder that the business
deteriorated? They claim as an excuse for their refusal
to continue with the agreement that the Respondents
wanted to be paid in full in conformity with the terms
of the contract. Appellants state that because sellers
wouldn't agree with changing the contract terms or
reducing their security through refinancing, they are
excused from performing and should get their pay--9-

ments back. When the contract was entered into it
was provided there was to be no prepayment on installments. The Respondents are elderly pe'Ople, and
to their testimony, they were retiring from
business and were relying upon these payments for
their living expenses (p. 101). When they insisted that
they be paid according to the contract with the interest, and refused to renegotiate or subordinate the property, then Appllants defaulted, refused to make the
payments, and made the election to give up the agree- '
ment.
1

The Respondents do not dispute the legal authorities cited by the Appellants and in fact agree with
them. When the rules are applied to the fact situation
in this case, however, there is no unjust enrichment.
The f'Orfeiture did not shock the conscience of the trial
court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE LAW OF FORFEITURE UNDER A REAL
ESTATE INSTALLMENT CONTRACT BY
OGNIZING THE RIGHT OF THE PARTIES TO
CONTRACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF PAYMENTS MADE ON A CONTRACT AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ON BUYERS DEFAULT IN MAKING THE PAYMENTS.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE SHOULD
NOT BE INTERFERED WITH WHEN THE FORFEITURE WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DID NOT
SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
The crux of Appellants appeal is based upon
pulling out snatches of dialogue between Court and
-10-
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Counsel during the trial and then attempting to reason that the Judge didn't understand the doctrine of
unjust enrichment as set forth by our Supreme Court
in the cases cited.
The Oourt stated on Page 4 of its Memorandum
Decision:
"This Court joins in the sentiment expressed in a concurring opinion by Justice W orthen in the Perkins v. Spencer, when he
said: 'I am in general agreement with the
doctrine that equity should give protection
to a defaulting purchaser, whose default is
neither wilful nor deliberate, against a
grasping vendor who is waiting to spring
the moment the vendee defaults in the
slightest manner, and who seeks not the
purchase money due him, but the property
sold plus enormous amounts in addition."
"As the court has hereinabove pointed out,
equity is not a sanctuary where one who
has made a bad bargain may find security
and shelter."
The trial court further concluded that the evidence in this case did not shock the conscience of the
Court.
The property was not in as good condition when
Respondents were required to take it back as when
it was sold (p. 186).
There was no longer a going business (p. 135).
There had been no improvements between the summer of 1959 and November of 1961, when it was closed
down (Jensen p. 102). The taxes were delinquent. Improvement assessments had not been paid. The motel
needed immediate repair. Furniture (beds-mattresses
-11-

(p. 188), the most important item in a motel) had to
be replaced (p. 227).

1

It is clear as the Lower Court held, that there

was no unconscionable benefit to Sellers. In fact, there
is still a loss and the evidence was that even after the
premises were retaken, the Respondents held
the matter open for over a year for the buyers to return and go forward on the agreement.

t

(P. 203):
Mrs. R. Nielsen, the seller, testifying:
"Q. Were you present during any conversation '
with the Jensens in the spring or in June or July of
1962, when they left indicating they were welcome to
come back if they would like to carry on with their
contract?"
"A. We told Mr. and Mrs. Jensen that we would '
keep the property in their name for one year and give
them a chance to redeem it. We saved their Sign for two
years and held it open for two years. There never was
a move made to redeem."
The Trial Court relied upon all of the following

cases:
Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, stated:
"On purchaser's default in making
payments on the purchase price of land and
vendor's election to terminate the contract
and re-enter, the vendor's measure of damages is the difference between the contract
price with interest and the value of the land
at the time of re-entry, plus the rental value
of the property from the time the contract
was terminated until re-entry, less any
payments made on the contract; and, where
the payments made on the contract exceed
-12-
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such damages such excess may be recovered by the purchaser."
Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, stated:
"Use of term 'penalty' or 'liquidated
damages' by parties to contract is not controlling in construction thereof, but
whether provision is to be construed
as agreement for liquidated damages 'Or for
penalty is to be determined by consideration of circumstances surrounding parties
at time of its execution."
"In equity suit, reviewing court is required to pass upon weight of evidence,
though in doubtful cases finding of trial
court should not be disturbed."
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, stated:
"The construction of a forfeiture provision in a contract, in order to determine
whether it is a provision for liquidated
damages and valid or whether it is for a
penalty, and not enforceable, depends on
an interpretation of the whole contract in
the light of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction."
''Where purchasers breached contract
for purchase of realty, vendors were entitled to recover as damages for the breach
the loss of an advantageous bargain, any
injury to or depreciation of the realty,
any decline in value due to change in
market value of the property, not otherwise allowed under first two items, and
fair rental value of realty during period
of occupancy."
-13-

Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 Utah

2

59, stated:

"Parties to contract to purchase real
estate have right to contract that in event
of default, all payments which have been
made will be forfeited as liquidated damages, and such right should not be lightly
interfered with, and it is only when forfeiture would be so grossly excessive as to
be entirely disproportionate to any possible
loss that might have been contemplated, so
that to enforce it would shock conscience,
that court of equity will ref use to enforce
provision."
"Trial judge's decision that forfeiture
of payments on contract to purchase real
estate, brought about by default in payment, constitutes penalty and not liquidated
damages, will be regarded as prima facie
correct and will not be disturbed unless
plainly erroneous."
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2 263, stated:
"In the absence of fraud or imposition,
parties to a con tract are bound by the price
or measure of value that they have agreed
on, and such price must be paid notwithstanding it may be excessive."
"Where purchaser refused to fulfill
contract for purchase of real estate on
grounds of vendor's fraud, but court determined no fraud had been practiced on
purchaser by vendors, vendors were entitled to be credited, in computation of
damage sustained because of breach of contract, with difference between contract
-14-

price and price forfeited property could be
sold for and, in view 'Of fact such amount
exceeded amount paid on contract by purchaser further inquiry as to whether or not
forfeiture provision of contract properly
assessed actual damages suffered by vendors was :foreclosed."
Strand v. Mayne, 14 Ut

2d

355 stated:

The court after discussing the Jacobson vs. Swan
decision applied to the fact situation stated:
"This clearly shows that the amount
they have lost under the forfeitive provision is not unconscionable or disproportionate to what the parties contemplated in
making the contract."
Consequently the Court looked at all the elements
of damage in order to determine the propriety of the
forfeiture. The Perkins case established damage critera
to be applied after the Court found the forfeiture
would be inequitable.
See the article by Ralph L. Jarman, Recent Utah
Developments on F'Orfeiturs in Real Estate Contracts,
7 Utah Law Review, p. 95, Forfeiture Under Real Estate Installment Contracts in Utah, 3 Utah L. Rev.
30, 1952. Bodenheimer.
The Trial Court's decision was to the effect there
was no unconscionability, hence there should be no
restitution and that Equity should not aid one breaching an agreement to profit from his own wrong.
CONCLUSION
Appellant argues that the Trial Court did not
understand the law of unjust enrichment and was in
-15-

error in not specifically applying the rules laid down
in the case of Perkins vs. Spencer.
Appellants overlook the fact that the numerous
cases since Perkins vs. Spencer recognize the right of
the parties to contract and that it is vnly when the
forfeiture is grossly excessive as to be entirely disproportionate to any loss suffered that the Court of Equity
should refuse to enforce the provision.
This Trial Court, after hearing the evidence, considering the payments made, the condition of the premises retaken and the income taken out of the business
during the four years occupancy, didn't feel any shock
by reason vf the forfeiture clause.

1

1

The Trial Court held "He who seeks equity must
do equity" and "that equity is not a sanctuary where
one who has made a bad bargain may find security and
shelter." This did not mean the Court did not consider
the factors involved but instead the Trial Court, after l
hearing the evidence, did not consider there was an I
unconscionable benefit to the sellers by reason of this
forfeiture provision.
j

I

The Lower Court's decision should be affirmed.
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50 North Main Street
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